State v. Taylor Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40553 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-15-2013
State v. Taylor Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40553
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Taylor Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40553" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4520.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 


















S.Ct. No. 40553-2012 
D.Ct. No. CR-FE-2011-0016247 
(Ada County) 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Deborah Whipple 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho 
In and For the County of Ada 
HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD 
District Judge 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities .................................................... 11 
II. Statement of the Case .................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 1 
B. Procedural History ................................................. 1 
C. Statement of Facts ................................................. 3 
III. Issues on Appeal ........................................................ 8 
IV. Argument ................................................................ 9 
A. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Delivery ......................... 9 
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Manufacture, Deliver or 
Possess With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance .................... 18 
C. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Deliver or Possess With 
Intent to Deliver Drug Paraphernalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21 
D. If an Acquittal is Not Entered in Count III, the Conviction Must Nonetheless be 
Reversed Because the Jury Was Misdirected ........................... 23 
V. Conclusion .......................................................... 28 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) ................................................ 9, 18,22 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970) ......................................................... 9, 18,22 
STATE CASES 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012) .............................................................. 23 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005) .................................. 12, 17,28 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,985 P.2d 117 (1999) ................................................. 11,12,17,28 
State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 394, 283 P.3d 141 (Ct. App. 2012) .............................. 9, 10, 18,21,23 
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 701 P.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1985) .................................................. 10 
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,261 P.3d 853 (2011) ................................................................ 23 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993) ................................................................ 10, 11 
State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 630 P.2d 665 (1981) ................................................................. 18 
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 957 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1998) ................................. 9, 10 
State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 129 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................... 13, 17,28 
State v. Joy, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d_, 2013 WL. 3185264 (2013) ............................... 23,28 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................... 9, 10 
State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 941 P.2d 1 (1997) .............................................. 10, 11, 17,28 
State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 745 P .2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1987) ................................................ 18 
State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 696 P.2d 856 (1985) .................................................................. 22 
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 201 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................... 18 
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 P.3d 582 (2010) .................................................................. 23 
11 
State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.3d 455 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................ 12, 13, 17,28 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217 (2008) ................................................................ 23 
State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174,953 P.2d 614 (1998) ................................................................. 12 
State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 185 P.3d 272 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................................ 9, 18 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996) ................................................................. 23 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Alley, No. 40428 ........................................................................................................... 4, 5 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const. Amend. 5 ................................................................................................ 9, 18,22,24 
U.S. Const. Amend 6 ................................................................................................................... 24 
U.S. Const. Amend. 14 ................................................................................................ 9, 18,22,24 
STATE STATUTES 
Idaho Const. Article I, § 13 .... ....... ............ ..... .................... .................................. ....... 9, 18, 22, 24 
I.C. § 18-1701 ............................................................................................................................... 1 
I.C. § 19-2406 ............................................................................................................................. 28 
I.C. §§ 37-2705 ........................................................................................................................... 16 
I.C.§37-2707 ............................................................................................................................. 16 
I.C. § 37-2732 .................................................................................................. 1,10,12,17,22,26 
OTHER 
Thomas Regnier, "Civilizing" Drug Paraphernalia Policy: Preserving Our Free Speech and 
Due Process Rights While Protecting Children, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. 
Pol'y 115, 154 (2011) ....................................................................................................... 14 
III 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. LC. § 37-
2732(a). Relief should be granted for two reasons: 1) because the evidence was insufficient to 
prove the offense - specifically the State failed to present evidence to prove that Matthew Taylor 
knew that the otherwise legal plant material he sold as part of his job at a retail shop had been 
treated with a controlled substance; and 2) in the alternative, a new trial should be granted 
because the jury instructions on the element of knowledge were misleading. Additionally, 
although Mr. Taylor's motion for a new trial was granted as to two conspiracy convictions, in 
both those charges the evidence was likewise insufficient to prove the offenses. Mr. Taylor was 
improperly convicted of conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance in the absence of any evidence that he entered into an agreement with others 
knowing that the otherwise legal plant material involved had been treated with a controlled 
substance. Mr. Taylor was also improperly convicted of conspiracy to deliver or possess with 
intent to deliver drug paraphernalia in the absence of evidence of an underlying intent that the 
items stocked by his employer would be used as drug paraphernalia. 
B. Procedural History 
Matthew Taylor was charged by indictment with conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of I.e. §§ 37-2732(a), 18-1701, 
and 37-2732(f); conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia in 
violation ofLC. §§ 37-2734B, 18-1701; and delivery ofa controlled substance in violation ofLe. 
§ 37-2732(a). R 13-17. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Taylor moved to dismiss all the charges on the basis that the State could 
not prove its case. With regard to conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to 
deliver, the State did not have evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the otherwise legal 
plant material involved had been treated with a controlled substance and therefore could not 
prove that he had entered an agreement to commit a crime involving a controlled substance. 
With regard to the conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, 
lacking evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the plant material involved was treated 
with a controlled substance, the State could not prove that the items for sale alongside the plant 
material were intended to be used with a controlled substance. And, with regard to the delivery 
charge, the State could not prove that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the plant material he 
delivered had been treated with a controlled substance. R 198-201. The motion was denied. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 629, In. 18-24. 
At the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Taylor moved for entry of judgments of acquittal 
pursuantto ICR29. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2555, In. 12 - p. 2556, In. 29. However, the motion was 
denied, Tr. Vol. III, p. 2565, In. 9-21, and Mr. Taylor was ultimately convicted on all counts. R 
338-341. 
Thereafter, Mr. Taylor filed motions for acquittal on all charges and in the alternative for 
a new trial on all charges. R 344-347. The Court denied the motion for acquittal on all charges. 
R 418-425. The Court also denied the motion for a new trial as it pertained to Count III, delivery 
of a controlled substance. R 432. However, the Court did grant new trials on both Counts I and 
II because it had failed to instruct the jury that a good faith belief that the object crime was not 
illegal is a defense to conspiracy. The Court found that the failure to properly instruct the jury 
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was both an error in the instructions to the jury and an error in the decision of a question of law. 
Mr. Taylor was subsequently sentenced on Count III to an aggregate term of five years, 
with the first two fixed and the remaining three indeterminate, but the Court suspended the 
sentence and placed Mr. Taylor on probation for a period of five years. R 437-443. 2 
C. Statement of Facts 
On September 8, 2011, Detective Andreoli began investigating activities at a leased 
warehouse in Boise. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1074, In. 17 - p. 1076, In. 24. Over time, police observed the 
I The State has filed a cross-appeal from the grant of a new trial on Counts I and II. R 
452-55. 
2 The Court tailored some of the terms of probation to Mr. Taylor's specific circumstance 
- at the time ofthe offense and continuing past the time of sentencing Mr. Taylor was undergoing 
treatment for lymphoma. His treatment included chemotherapy, R 36, hospitalizations, R 73, and 
a stem cell transplant. R 87; Tr. 4/24112, p. 9, In. 10 - p. 11, In. 2. When Mr. Taylor was arrested 
on October 14, 2011, his bond was set at $250,000. R 22. On October 17,2011, he moved for a 
reduction in bond because he was indigent and could not post such an amount. R 28. On 
October 20,2011, Mr. Taylor again moved for a reduction in bond amount. This motion was 
supported by a letter from Dr. Stephanie Hodson, Mr. Taylor's medical oncologist. Dr. Hodson 
wrote that Mr. Taylor was in the course of chemotherapy; his CT scan on October 13,2011, had 
shown issues which required evaluation and treatment as soon as possible and delays could 
potentially place his health in serious jeopardy. R 34-36. The State argued against that bond 
reduction and it was not granted. R 45. On October 31, 2011, Mr. Taylor's sister filed an 
affidavit with the Court stating that she had a durable power of attorney for health care for Mr. 
Taylor and had been in consultation with his doctors. She reported that Mr. Taylor had been held 
in jail since October 14, 2011, but had not been allowed to see a doctor. The jail told her that the 
jail's doctor was out of town and therefore Mr. Taylor could not be seen by an MD. She also 
reported that the jail informed her that Mr. Taylor would not be supplied with the diet required in 
conjunction with his ongoing chemotherapy treatments. Mr. Taylor's sister stated that because of 
the chemotherapy her brother was suffering nausea and vomiting and was at a high risk of 
infection. R 46-48. The State continued to argue that the $250,000 bond was appropriate. 
However, the Court released Mr. Taylor on his own recognizance with active GPS monitoring. 
R 50. Unfortunately, Mr. Taylor's cancer grew while he spent those weeks in the jail. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 564, In. 3-4. 
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warehouse and those coming and going from it and on multiple occasions seized trash discarded 
outside of it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1146, In. 7 - p. 1223, In. 16. In the course of following people who 
had been seen at the warehouse, the police expanded their surveillance to include a residence and 
a business, The Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1224, In. 11 - p. 1244, In. 15. 
Morgan Alley was the lessee of the warehouse, an occupant of the residence, and the 
registered agent of the LLC which owned the Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1249, In. 11-23; p. 
1259, In. 6-22. 
Mr. Alley testified that he had been using the warehouse to make Twizted Potpourri. To 
make the potpourri, he applied a chemical to otherwise legal plant material. He had spoken with 
people who had paid a chemist to determine which chemicals he could legally use in Idaho. 
Pursuant to that consultation and knowing that AM-2201 was being sold throughout the state, 
Mr. Alley believed the substance AM-2201 could be applied to plant leaves and sold without any 
violation of state law. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1931, In. 2-10; p. 1993, In. 1-18. 
In fact, controversy about the legality of AM-2201 remains. Prior to trial, Mr. Alley, later 
joined by his co-defendants, filed a motion to dismiss because AM-2201 is not actually included 
in Idaho's drug statute. In the alternative, he argued that the statute is unconstitutional. Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 9, In. 4 - p. 407, In. 10. The Court denied the motion. R 681-701. Mr. Alley pled guilty 
following the denial of the motion to dismiss and has appealed asserting that the statute does not 
criminalize AM-220 1 or in the alternative that the statute is unconstitutional. See State v. Alley, 
No. 40428, Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 8-9. The State has argued that Mr. Alley's appeal 
is moot because he was also charged with manufacturing and delivering synthetic marijuana 
containing JWM-O 19 and JWM-2 10 which he admits are controlled substances within the scope 
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of Schedule 1. State v. Alley, No. 40428, Respondent's Brief at page 4, ftnt. 1.3 The appeal 
remains pending. 
Mr. Alley testified at Mr. Taylor's trial that in the warehouse he (Mr. Alley) would pack 
legal plant material into a pitcher. He would spray the material with AM-2201, pour on acetone, 
and leave everything to dry for a couple of days. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2030, In. 19-25. No one else was 
ever present when he did this. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2034, In. 19-21. After the material dried, he would 
transfer it to tubs where he flavored it with tobacco flavoring to provide scents. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
2037, In. 1-24. Mr. Alley hired several people, including Mr. Taylor's co-defendants, but not 
Mr. Taylor, to package and label the resulting product which he named Twizted Potpourri. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 1996, In. 14 - p. 1999, In. 25. Mr. Alley showed at least one person involved in the 
packaging process a lab report which stated that AM-2201 was legal. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2090, In. 
15-25. 
Mr. Alley wholesaled his product both in and out of state and in mid-September started 
selling it at his newly opened shop, The Red Eye Hut. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2008, In. 8 - p. 2009, In. 10. 
The Hut sold candy, snacks, drinks, tobacco, blankets, potpourri, scales, drug testing kits, and a 
variety of glass and metal items including pipes. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1098, In. 6 - p. 1100, In. 24. 
Mr. Alley knew Mr. Taylor from junior high. They lost contact, but when Mr. Alley 
heard that Mr. Taylor had cancer he got in touch with him. Eventually, Mr. Alley asked Mr. 
Taylor to work at his store. Tr. Vol. II, p. 13 78, In. 10 - p. 13 80, In. 5; Vol. III, p. 1923, In. 4 - p. 
1924, In. 8. 
3 The State's brief in Alley refers to JWM-019 and JWM-21 O. In the District Court the 
molecules were referred to as JWH-019 and JWH-210. See for example, Tr. Vol. I, p. 41, In. 13; 
p. 102, In. 12-15; Vol. III, p. 2465, In. 24-25. 
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In total, the Red Eye Hut was open for only six days. Mr. Taylor worked for Mr. Alley in 
the store just three or four times. His job was to be cashier and clerk and do end of day tasks like 
shutting down the sign and lights. Mr. Alley never got around to paying Mr. Taylor for the few 
hours he worked. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2019, In. 7 - p. 2020, In. 13. 
Mr. Alley told Mr. Taylor that the potpourri was legal, supporting this by showing Mr. 
Taylor the lab report. He also instructed Mr. Taylor that if anyone came in the store acting as if 
he or she was planning to use the products like the pipes illegally, Mr. Taylor was to kick the 
person out. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2020, In. 14 - p. 2021, In. 11, p. 2102, In. 13 - p. 2103, In. 4, p. 2105, 
In. 23 - p. 2106, In. 7. Mr. Alley did not tell Mr. Taylor that he put AM-2201 or any other 
controlled substance on the potpourri. Rather, he told all his warehouse employees (Mr. Taylor 
never worked at the warehouse) and Mr. Taylor that the potpourri was legal. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2102, 
In. 13 - p. 2103, In. 5. 
After becoming aware of the store, on September 26,2011, and after a controlled buy 
from another store employee, Detective Andreoli went inside pretending to be a regular 
customer. Mr. Taylor was there and the detective engaged him in conversation. The detective 
introduced himself as "Joe" and Mr. Taylor responded with his own name, "Matt." Tr. Vol. II, p. 
1114, In. 7 - p. 1115, In. 19. 
"Joe" asked how long the store had been open and Mr. Taylor responded that it opened on 
September 22. Mr. Taylor said that a different head shop had been in the same location, but this 
was new ownership with a new name. He also said that he had worked at the old shop. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1116, In. 1-10; p. 1351, In. 10-19. 
"Joe" asked Mr. Taylor about the Twizted Potpourri and Mr. Taylor said that it was what 
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used to be called spice. He said that the different types of Twizted had different scents and he 
unscrewed the lids of the containers for "Joe" to smell. "Joe" asked which type to try, and Mr. 
Taylor said that Ultra Hypnotic was one of the most popular. "Joe" asked about a pipe for 
smoking the potpourri and Mr. Taylor replied, "Technically, the stuffs not for human 
consumption." He also added in a lower tone, "We kind of have to say that." Tr. Vol. II, p. 
1352, In. 21 - p. 1353, In. 4. 
Mr. Taylor next said the plain Ultra was also a good type because it had no added flavor 
which the detective took to mean that Mr. Taylor did not like added flavor in potpourri that is to 
be smoked. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1353, In. 14-23. 
The detective asked more questions about where the pipes came from and Mr. Taylor said 
that they all came from Washington because the local artists' work was too expensive. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 1354, In. 11-21. 
Mr. Taylor also told the detective that Twizted Potpourri was made locally by the owner 
of the store and that it was being wholesaled throughout the country. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1355, In. 2 -
p. 1356, In. 18. 
The detective bought three containers of potpourri from Mr. Taylor - Ultra Hypnotic, 
Ultra and Ultra Blueberry. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1357, In. 10-13. Testing showed that the containers of 
Ultra and Ultra Hypnotic contained plant material plus JWH-019 while the Ultra Blueberry 
contained plant material plus AM-2201. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2469, In. 9 - p. 2471, In. 18. The State 
presented Mr. Alley's testimony that he put the AM-2201 on the potpourri, but presented no 
evidence as to how JWH-019 got into the mix. See Tr. Vol. I-III. 
Eventually, search warrants were executed on the warehouse, the residence, and the store. 
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Approximately 30,000 containers of potpourri were seized from the warehouse. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
2298, In. 10-24. Nine thousand three hundred and sixty-six containers of potpourri and 340 pipes 
were found in the store. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2158, In. 6 - p. 2160, In. 10. 
Mr. Taylor was contacted by the police a few days later. He was cooperative and 
voluntarily went to the police department to be interviewed by Detective Andreoli. Tr. Vol. II, p. 
1371, In. 24 - p. 1372, In. 4. 
The detective believed that Mr. Taylor recognized him and was surprised that he was a 
detective and not a customer. However, Mr. Taylor told the detective that he did not recognize 
him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1375, In. 10-19. 
Mr. Taylor initially denied making any sale to the detective. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1379, In. 15-
16. Mr. Taylor also said that he had believed that all the items for sale in the store were legal 
items and that he had done nothing wrong. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1382, In. 4-7. 
Detective Andreoli testified that spice or potpourri had not always been illegal. The law 
changed as of March 2011 based upon an emergency rule. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2378, In. 17 - p. 2380, 
In. 6. While one ofthe State's forensic chemists appeared to believe that the law now prohibited 
all synthetic cannabinoids in Idaho, Tr. Vol. III, p. 2453, In. 16-20, the State's other chemist 
testified that only some synthetic cannabinoids are illegal in Idaho. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2450, In. 7-9. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove illegal delivery of a controlled substance given 
the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the plant material in potpourri 
contained a controlled substance? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess 
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with intent to deliver a controlled substance given the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or 
believed that the plant material in potpourri contained a controlled substance? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to 
deliver drug paraphernalia, given the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the 
plant material involved contained a controlled substance and the consequent lack of proof that 
the items sold alongside the plant material were intended to be used in conjunction with a 
controlled substance? 
4. In the alternative, should the conviction on Count III be reversed because the jury was 
misdirected concerning the knowledge requirement for the offense of delivery of a controlled 
substance? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Delivery 
Due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071 
(1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-6, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979). United States 
Const. Amends. 5 and 14, Idaho Const. Article I, § 13. 
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a guilty verdict will be 
overturned when there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could 
have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 394, 396-7, 283 P.3d 141, 143-4 (Ct. App. 2012); 
State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-2,185 P.3d 272, 273-4 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 
9 
Idaho 101, 104,822 P.2d 998,1001 (Ct. App. 1991). The appellate court does not substitute its 
view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Curry, supra., citing 
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 
304 (Ct. App. 1985). And, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the state. 
Curry, supra, citing Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385,957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 
104,822 P.2d at 1001. However, if the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, the 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Curry, supra; Herrera-Brito, supra. 
In Count III of the Indictment, Mr. Taylor was charged with delivery of a controlled 
substance in violation of1.C. § 37-2732(a). The elements of that offense include that the 
defendant delivered any amount of the controlled substance to another and that the defendant 
either knew or believed it was a controlled substance. See ICn 404. State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 941 P .2d 1 (1997). In this case, the evidence was not sufficient to prove the 
knowledge element. 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P .2d 181 (1993), first discussed the knowledge element 
in a controlled substance violation. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that the text ofIdaho's 
possession statute does not set forth a mental element, and turned to 1. C. § 18-114 to determine 
the required intent. The Court wrote that the intent required is "not the intent to commit a crime, 
but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the 
failure to perform the required act." 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183, citing State v. Parish, 79 
Idaho 75, 78, 310 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1957), quoting State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 738, 87 P.2d 
454,460-61 (1939). 
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Applying that intent requirement, the Court held that a mistake of law is not a defense to 
a controlled substances charge, but did not address a mistake of fact claim. Fox had possessed a 
substance knowing that it was ephedrine. The Court, stating, "Fox does not claim that he did not 
know he possessed ephedrine," found that knowledge that he possessed ephedrine was sufficient 
to support a conviction regardless of whether Fox understood that ephedrine was a prohibited 
substance. Fox, supra. 
Four years later, the Court resolved the question of whether intent can be proven in the 
absence of evidence that the defendant knew he possessed a substance - in other words, a mistake 
of fact. In State v. Lamphere, supra, the Supreme Court held that knowledge as to what 
substance the defendant possessed (as opposed to the legality of the substance) was an element of 
the offense of possession. The Court reversed Lamphere's conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine for several reasons including that the district court erroneously excluded 
evidence that would have corroborated Lamphere's testimony that he did not know what was 
inside the vial in his possession. 
Two years later, the Court again addressed the knowledge element in State v. Blake, 133 
Idaho 237,985 P.2d 117 (1999). Blake, a passenger in a car which contained methamphetamine, 
a scale, and other paraphernalia, was arrested. At the jail, an officer found a sports wallet 
containing cocaine in Blake's underwear. In vacating Blake's drug convictions, the Court wrote: 
To establish Blake's guilt, the State must prove that Blake knowingly possessed 
methamphetamine and knowingly possessed cocaine. In the present case, the 
instructions would allow the jury to convict Blake if he knew there was some 
substance under his seat and something in the wallet but truly, although 
negligently, believed those substances to be harmless such as sugar. In such a 
case, Blake's ignorance or mistake of fact, if believed by the jury should disprove 
any criminal intent, requiring an acquittal. 
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133 Idaho at 242,985 P.2d at 122. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court referenced 
Justice Schroeder's special concurrence in State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 178, 953 P .2d 614, 
618 (1998), stating, "[I]f a person possesses a controlled substance in the mistaken belief that it is 
a different substance that is in fact legal to possess, there is no violation of the law." Blake, 
supra. 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong again recognized that the State must 
prove that the defendant knew what material he possessed in order to prove a drug offense. The 
Court wrote: 
In order to secure a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732(c), the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed 
the controlled substance, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of 
a drug. Thus, the defendant's ignorance of the presence of the substance, or 
mistaken belief that it was an innocuous material, if believed by the jury, would 
be exculpatory. I.C. § 18-201(1). For example, one who truly believed that the 
powdery substance in a package was a harmless item, such as sugar, could not be 
convicted of possession. The requisite knowledge of the presence of a controlled 
substance may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the 
circumstances. 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64-5, 122 P.3d 321, 323-4 (Ct. App. 2005), citations omitted, 
emphasis original. 
And, then just a few months later, in State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.3d 455 (Ct. 
App. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that while the State need not prove that a defendant knew 
the exact nature of the controlled substance possessed or delivered, the State must nonetheless 
prove that the defendant knew that he possessed some illegal substance. 
[O]ne might possess an illegal drug under the mistaken belief that it was a legal 
substance - for example possessing methamphetamine while truly believing that it 
was sugar. In such a case, the defendant's mistake of fact, if believed by the jury, 
requires an acquittal because the criminal intent element of the offense is not 
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present. 
142 Idaho at 703, 132 P.3d at 460 (citations omitted). 
The same day as Stefani was decided, the Court of Appeals also decided State v. Hopper, 
142 Idaho 512, 129 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2005). Like Stefani, the Hopper decision affirmed that 
proof of possession of a controlled substance requires proof that the defendant is conscious of the 
fact that he is in possession of the substance - a defendant may not be convicted ifhe was 
unaware of the nature of the substance he possessed. 142 Idaho at 514, 129 P.3d at 1263. 
In Mr. Taylor's case, there was not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of 
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential element 
of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. A State's chemist testified that not all synthetic 
cannabinoids are illegal in Idaho. Mr. Alley testified that he never told Mr. Taylor what was in 
the potpourri. To the contrary Mr. Alley showed Mr. Taylor a lab report stating that the 
potpourri was legal. In short, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Taylor knew what was in 
the potpourri or that it contained a Schedule I drug. 
In response to Mr. Taylor's motion for acquittal in the District Court, the State did not 
attempt to argue that it had direct proof that Mr. Taylor knew that an illegal substance was in the 
potpourri. Rather, the State argued that Mr. Taylor's statements in the store were "clear evidence 
of his understanding and knowledge of not only the manufacture of the Twizted Potpourri but 
also the distribution out of state via Fed Ex." R 376. However, while Mr. Taylor did tell "Joe" 
that the potpourri was made locally and distributed throughout the country, he never said that he 
knew there was any controlled substance present in the material. In fact, his statements about 
sending the material around the country and his pride in its local origins indicates quite the 
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opposite. If Mr. Taylor had any knowledge at all that the potpourri contained controlled 
substances, he would not brag to a complete stranger that it was made locally by his employer 
and that it was shipped throughout the country. 
The State further argued that Mr. Taylor's reference to the store as a "head shop" 
demonstrated his knowledge that the potpourri contained controlled substances. R 376. But, 
"head shops" do not necessarily sell marijuana or even synthetic marijuana. Jon Gettman, a 
former staff member of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) 
owned a head shop which operated with the slogan: "Everything you need but the Weed." 
Thomas Regnier, "Civilizing" Drug Paraphernalia Policy: Preserving Our Free Speech and Due 
Process Rights While Protecting Children, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 115, 154 (2011). 
Simply because a shop is a "head shop" does not mean that every or even any item in the 
inventory is known by the employees of the shop to contain controlled substances. 
The State also argued that Mr. Taylor's statement that the potpourri was not for human 
consumption and that "we kind of have to say that" followed by his suggestion of a flavor 
indicates that he knew the potpourri contained controlled substances. R 376-7. However, the 
statement that the potpourri was not for human consumption gives no indication whatsoever that 
Mr. Taylor knew that it contained controlled substances - any more than the label on a container 
of bleach which says "Not for human consumption" indicates that the bleach contains controlled 
substances. The statement, "we kind of have to say that" is no more indicative of an awareness 
of the presence of illegal substances than a statement by a bank officer that he is required by 
federal law to inform a potential debtor that the debtor has three days to reconsider and cancel is 
indicative of an intent to make an illegal loan. And, the suggestion of a flavor is no more proof 
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that Mr. Taylor knew that the potpourri contained controlled substances than a waiter's statement 
at Olive Garden that he likes the minestrone better than the zuppa toscana is proofthat he knows 
exactly what ingredients are in each as opposed to knowing simply that the cook has told him 
that he is running low on zuppa toscana. 
The State further argued that Mr. Taylor's knowledge that the glass pipes for sale in the 
shop came from out of state proves his knowledge that the potpourri contained controlled 
substances. R 377. This argument requires such a huge leap in logic that response is impossible. 
Knowing that glass was made in another state does not in any way indicate that Mr. Taylor knew 
that the potpourri contained controlled substances. 
Lastly, the State argued that Mr. Taylor's denial of having made a sale to the detective 
and his attempts to distance himself from the store indicated that he knew that the potpourri 
contained controlled substances. R 377. However, Mr. Taylor was not interviewed by police 
until after the search warrants had been executed, Mr. Alley and others had been arrested, and the 
entire episode had been reported in the news. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2869, In. 19 - p. 2870, In. 8. At the 
time, Mr. Taylor was in treatment for cancer and had good reason to fear spending any time at all 
in jail, regardless of whether he knew he had violated the law or whether he believed he was 
innocent. (As noted above, the time he did spend injail was almost certainly deleterious to his 
health). The fact that he was afraid and tried to distance himself from people who had been 
arrested in order to avoid joining them in pretrial detention is neither surprising nor probative 
that he knew that the potpourri contained a controlled substance. Moreover, the fact that he 
voluntarily came to the police station for an interview and was cooperative was actually 
indicative of his belief that there were no controlled substances in the potpourri and that he had 
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done nothing wrong. 
The District Court denied the motion for acquittal on the basis that there was evidence 
that Mr. Taylor knew that he was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid. R 424-25. However, 
that analysis misses the salient point - even if someone believed that there was evidence that Mr. 
Taylor knew that he was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid (which as discussed above there 
was not), there was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Taylor knew either that every synthetic 
cannabinoid is illegal or in the alternative that he possessed a particular synthetic cannabinoid 
that is illegal. Rather, the evidence showed that Mr. Taylor had been told that the potpourri was 
legal. 
The State could not prove that Mr. Taylor knew that every synthetic cannabinoid is illegal 
in Idaho both because it had no proof ofMr. Taylor's legal expertise and because in fact, not 
every cannabinoid is a Schedule I substance. The State's own chemist testified that not every 
cannabinoid is controlled in Idaho. Moreover, the Idaho Code makes clear that not every 
cannabinoid is a Schedule I substance. (Mr. Taylor was charged only with delivery of a Schedule 
I substance. R 13-17.) For example, dronabinol, which is a cannabinoid used in treatment of 
cancer and HIV/AIDS, is specifically excluded from Schedule I. I.C. §§ 37-2705(3)(i)(a); 37-
2 709(g)( 1 ). www.nlm.nih.gov/medilineplus/druginfo/meds/1607 0 54 .html, accessed June 21, 
2013. Likewise, nabilone, another cannabinoid prescribed for cancer patients, is apparently 
excluded from Schedule I because it is specifically included in Schedule II. I.e. § 37-2707(f)(1). 
www.dailymed.nlm.nig.gov/dailymed/lookup.cfm?setid=l 0553514-8001-528l-54b6-
96d9gef6822a, accessed on June 21, 2013. 
Furthermore, the State cannot prospectively outlaw all cannabinoids including those not 
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yet developed at the time of the enactment of the controlled substances statute. To be prohibited 
as a Schedule I substance, I.C. § 37-2704 requires that the pharmacy board find that the 
substance: a) has a high potential for abuse; and (b) has no accepted medical use in treatment in 
the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision. Yet, as 
noted above, some synthetic cannabinoids are already being used in medical treatments in the 
U.S. And, studies are currently being conducted on potential medical uses of other synthetic 
cannabinoids. See, A Neumeister, MD, et.al, Elevated brain cannabinoid CB 1 receptor 
availability in post-traumatic stress disorder: a positron emission tomography study, Molecular 
Psychiatry, 14 May 2013. This study may lead to a cannabinoid pharmacological treatment for 
PTSD. Brain Imaging Study Links Cannabinoid Receptors to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: 
First Pharmaceutical Treatment for PTSD Within Reach, Science Daily, May 14,2013. 
www.sciencedaily.comlreleases/2013/06113051405016.htm. accessed June 21, 2013. There are 
cannabinoids both existing today and being developed that do not and will not meet the 
requirements for inclusion in Schedule I. 
Insofar as the Court's denial ofMr. Taylor's motion for acquittal was based upon a belief 
that all cannabinoids are included in Schedule I, the Court was simply wrong as a matter of law. 
Because not all cannabinoids are on Schedule I, to prove knowledge, the State was required to 
prove that Mr. Taylor knew that he was delivering a synthetic cannabinoid that was among the 
cannabinoids that are included in I.C. § 37-2705. The State failed to produce any such evidence. 
Proof of knowing possession of the substance that is controlled is an essential element of 
delivery. Lamphere, supra; Blake, supra; Armstrong, supra; Stefani, supra; Hopper, supra. In 
this case, there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found 
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that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the knowledge element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's conviction for delivery must be reversed and an acquittal entered. 
Curry, supra. 
B. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Manufacture, 
Deliver or Possess With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance 
Mr. Taylor's motion for acquittal of Count I charging conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, 
or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance was denied, although he was granted a 
new trial on that charge. In this appeal, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Taylor's 
motion for acquittal, reverse his conviction on Count I and enter an acquittal because the 
evidence is insufficient to prove an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective and the requisite 
intent to commit the underlying crimes. 
As set out above, due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense. In re Winship, supra; Jackson v. 
Virginia, supra. U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Article I, § 13. 
The elements of conspiracy are: (1) an agreement between two or more individuals to 
accomplish an illegal objective; (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the 
illegal purpose; and (3) the requisite intent to commit the underlying substantive offense. State v. 
Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 384, 630 P.2d 665, 671 (1981); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466, 745 
P.2d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App. 1987). Conspiracy is a specific intent crime. It requires that the State 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to agree or to conspire to accomplish an illegal 
objective and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. State v. 
Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691, 201 P.3d 657,664 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Warburton, supra. 
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In this case, to prove that Mr. Taylor was guilty of conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Taylor agreed to 
accomplish an illegal objective and intended to commit the offense of delivery of a controlled 
substance. In denying Mr. Taylor's motion for acquittal, the District Court noted the following 
evidence which it says supported the guilty verdict: 
1) Mr. Taylor had worked for the Red Eye Hut's predecessor which sold spice; 
2) The bulk of the inventory of the shop was material associated with drugs and 
marijuana; 
3) The plant material was intended to be smoked for its hallucinogenic and intoxicating 
effect; 
4) Mr. Taylor used the term "head shop" to describe the shop; 
5) Mr. Taylor said that potpourri used to be called spice; 
6) Mr. Taylor made the comments about potpourri not being for human consumption; 
7) Mr. Taylor suggested a type of potpourri that was good because it had no added flavor; 
8) Mr. Taylor denied selling the potpourri in the interview in the police station; 
9) Mr. Taylor discussed the legality ofthe potpourri with Mr. Alley. 
R 422-23. 
This evidence is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt of either an agreement to deliver a 
Schedule I substance or an intent to deliver a Schedule I substance. Most of the evidence 
referenced by the Court was discussed in Section A above, and as set out there, was not 
supportive of a guilty verdict. 
In addition, the fact that Mr. Taylor previously worked for a shop that sold spice is not 
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probative of a current intent to deliver a Schedule I substance not in the least because spice was 
not outlawed until October 15,2010. See C.L. "Butch" Otter News Release, October 15,2010, 
attached as appendix to this brief. Previous employment in a shop that sold then legal material is 
not probative of an intent to later deliver a Schedule I substance. 
As discussed above, the fact that the shop's inventory was material associated with drugs 
is not probative of an intent to deliver a Schedule I substance. A store can sell all manner of 
legal material associated with marijuana without selling marijuana. It makes no more sense to 
say that because the Red Eye Hut sold legal material that could be associated with drugs, the 
employees also intended to sell Schedule I drugs than to say that because Cabela's sells legal 
firearms, its employees also intend to sell illegal weapons. 
Any evidence that the plant material was intended to be smoked for its hallucinogenic and 
intoxicating effect was not specifically tied to Mr. Taylor. Even if one could argue that the State 
proved that Mr. Alley intended for the material to be smoked for a hallucinogenic and 
intoxicating effect, it did not prove that Mr. Taylor shared the same intent. 
Moreover, not every hallucinogenic and intoxicating substance is illegal - as noted above, 
not all cannabinoids are illegal. And, other plants not related to marijuana and not containing 
synthetic cannabinoids are hallucinogenic and/or intoxicating and are not illegal. For example, 
Salvia Divinorum, a member of the mint family can be smoked for its hallucinogenic effects, but 
does not contain cannabinoids and is not illegal under either United States or Idaho law. Salvia 
Divinorum and Salvinorin A, DEA Office of Diversion Control, Drug & Chemical Evaluation 
Section. http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info.salvia _ d.pdf accessed on June 28, 
2013, attached as appendix to this brief. And, of course, nicotine, a component of tobacco, 
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legally sold at the Red Eye Hut for smoking, is an addictive drug which increases dopamine in 
the brain producing feelings of pleasure. 
http://www .surgeongeneral. gov Ilibrary Ireports/to baccosmokel chapter4. pdf, accessed June 28, 
2013. Even if the State had proven that Mr. Taylor, as opposed to Mr. Alley, intended for 
customers to smoke potpourri for a high of some sort, it did not prove that Mr. Taylor knew that 
the potpourri contained a Schedule I substance as opposed to some legal substance which could 
produce a high. 
Lastly, evidence that Mr. Taylor discussed the legality of potpourri with Mr. Alley does 
not go to prove that Mr. Taylor intended to deliver a Schedule I substance as the District Court 
opined. Rather, it goes to prove the opposite. In fact, the District Court's conclusion was 
Orwellian: War is peace; freedom is slavery; assurance of legality is proof of knowledge of 
illegality. All the evidence presented showed that Mr. Alley assured Mr. Taylor that the 
potpourri was legal - this assurance is probative of Mr. Taylor's intent to only sell legal, as 
opposed to illegal, materials. 
Because there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving that Mr. Taylor agreed with others to 
accomplish an illegal objective or that he had the requisite intent to commit the underlying crime, 
this Court should enter an order granting an acquittal on Count 1. Curry, supra. 
C. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Deliver or Possess 
With Intent to Deliver Drug Paraphernalia 
Mr. Taylor's motion for acquittal of Count II charging conspiracy to deliver or possess 
with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia was denied, although he was granted a new trial on that 
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charge. In this appeal, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Taylor's motion for 
acquittal, reverse his conviction on Count II and enter an acquittal because the evidence is 
insufficient to prove either an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective or the requisite intent 
to commit a crime. 
As set out above, due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element ofthe offense. In re Winship, supra; Jackson v. 
Virginia, supra. U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Article I, § 13. 
Given the evidence was insufficient to prove either conspiracy to deliver or delivery of a 
controlled substance, it is also insufficient to prove conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to 
deliver drug paraphernalia. Many items, including some of the items sold in the Red Eye Hut, 
can be used either for legal purposes or for illegal purposes. For example, a pipe can be used to 
smoke legal tobacco or illegal marijuana. In order to prove a violation ofLC. § 37-2734B which 
prohibits delivery or possession with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, "proof must be 
presented beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold or marketed an item with the intent 
that it be used with drugs." State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 13,696 P.2d 856, 864 (1985) 
(emphasis original). 
In this case, there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Taylor, who believed 
that the potpourri did not contain any controlled substance, conspired with anyone with the 
requisite intent to commit the underlying crime of delivery or possession with intent to deliver 
drug paraphernalia because there was no evidence that Mr. Taylor possessed or delivered any 
item with an intent that it be used with drugs. Id In fact, the evidence was that his intent was to 
expel from the store any customer who expressed an interest in buying items to use as drug 
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paraphernalia. Therefore, an acquittal should be entered on Count II. Curry, supra. 
D. If an Acquittal is Not Entered in Count III, the Conviction Must 
Nonetheless be Reversed Because the Jury Was Misdirected 
As set out in Argument Section A above, an acquittal should be entered on Count III 
(delivery) because the evidence was insufficient to prove intent. If an acquittal is not granted, 
reversal is nonetheless required because the jury instructions were misleading. 
'The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and whether the 
jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law over which [the appellate 
court] exercises free review.' State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 
417,444 (2012) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 
(1996)). However, '[a]n erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error 
unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.' State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588,261 P.3d 853,865 (2011) (citing [State v.] 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho [355,] 373-74,247 P.3d [582,] 600-01 [(2010)]) .... 
State v. Joy, _ Idaho _, _P.3d_, 2013 WL 3185264 (2013). 
In this case, the District Court erred in giving, over Mr. Taylor's objection, Instruction 27 
and in denying Mr. Taylor's proposed instruction on mistake of fact, and further erred in denying 
Mr. Taylor's motion for a new trial based upon the instructional error. (The denial of a motion 
for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 
P .3d 217, 222 (2008)). The result was that the jury was misdirected. 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine and requested jury instruction precluding 
Mr. Taylor from presenting testimony and/or evidence relating to 'ignorance of the law' or his 
lack of knowledge of the illegality of the substances contained in the potpourri. The State also 
requested that the Court give IClI 1511 Ignorance or Mistake of Law Defense. R 135-142.4 Mr. 
4 IClI 1511 provides: "When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did what the 
law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the act was unlawful 
or that the person believed it to be lawful." 
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Taylor filed a written objection. R 169-170. In his memorandum in support of his objection, Mr. 
Taylor argued that to prove delivery, the State must prove that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that 
the substance he delivered was a controlled substance and that the State's proposed instruction 
would deny him his right to due process, right to present a defense and right to a fair trial under 
the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. R 171-179. 
A hearing was held. At that hearing, the Court asked the State to discuss the difference 
between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law. The State conceded that if a naive person went 
into the Red Eye Hut and bought potpourri believing that it was the same sort of potpourri old 
ladies use to make their houses smell nice that the defendant could present evidence that he or 
she believed it was a truly harmless substance like sugar. Tr. Vol. I, p. 441, In. 4 - p. 444, In. 4. 
However, the State further argued that in Mr. Taylor's case, ICn 1511 should be given because, 
" ... it's the state's view that the defendants either knew what they are dealing with was the 
synthetic drugs ... or believed it was a controlled substance ... and therefore the ignorance or 
mistake oflaw defense instruction applies." Tr. Vol. I, p. 450, In. 25 - p. 451, In. 7. After 
hearing argument from all the co-defendants, the District Court held that it would not rule on jury 
instructions until after it had heard the evidence. Tr. Vol. I, p. 477, In. 11-13. 
At the close of the trial, the State again requested that the jury be given IC]I 1511 stating 
that mistake oflaw is not a defense. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2674, In. 23 - p. 2675, In. 3. Mr. Taylor 
again objected. Mr. Taylor pointed out that he was not asserting a mistake oflaw, but rather a 
mistake of fact. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2677, In. 7-16. The District Court held that IC]I 1511 is a correct 
statement of the law and would be given. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2678, In. 1-2. 
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In light of the Court's decision to give IC]I 1511, Mr. Taylor requested that the Court also 
give IC]I 1510, Ignorance or mistake of fact defense. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2678, In. 15 - p, 2689, In. 
15.5 The Court initially refused that instruction. Tr. Vol. III, p. 2689, In. 17. However, the Court 
then later determined to give the instruction but only relevant to the conspiracy charges. Tr. Vol. 
III, p. 2737, In. 17 - pg. 2739, In. 16. 
R307. 
R308. 
The Court's instructions regarding mistake oflaw and mistake of fact were as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
For a defendant to be guilty of conspiracy, the state must prove the defendant had 
a particular intent. Evidence was offered that at the time of the alleged offense the 
defendant mistakenly believed certain facts. You should consider such evidence 
in determining whether the defendant had the required intent. 
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had 
such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which the law declares 
to be a crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the act was 
unlawful or that the person believed it to be lawful. 
5 IC]I 1510 provides: 
For the defendant to be guilty of [name of the offense], the state must prove the 
defendant had a particular intent. Evidence was offered that at the time of the 
alleged offense the defendant [was ignorant of] [ or] [mistakenly believed] certain 
facts. You should consider such evidence in determining whether the defendant 
had the required intent. 
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had 
such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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Following the trial, Mr. Taylor filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
District Court had misdirected the jury in a matter of law and erred in the decision of a question 
oflaw and that the verdict was contrary to law or evidence. I.C. § 19-2406(4) and (5). R 346-
348. 
With regard to the erroneous jury instructions on Count III, Mr. Taylor submitted the 
following summary of the evidence: 
1) Morgan Alley believed the substance, AM-2201, he sprayed upon the green 
plant material was legal. Mr. Taylor was told he would be selling 'Twizted 
Potpourri' and that the substance was legal. 
2) Mr. Alley was the only one who sprayed the illegal chemical AM-2201 on 
otherwise legal plan material, and he was the only one who had knowledge of the 
chemical. 
3) Mr. Alley did not know that JWH-019 or JWH-210 was in his 'Twizted 
Potpourri,' and he never told Mr. Taylor that either ofthose chemicals was 
present. 
4) Through the testimonies of Detective Andreoli and Morgan Alley, the jury 
learned that Mr. Taylor believed it was legal. 
5) There was testimony from Detective Andreoli that Mr. Taylor knew the 
'Twizted Potpourri' was to be smoked, but there was no testimony as to why 
anyone would smoke it. 
6) There was no testimony that Mr. Taylor knew that Mr. Alley was spraying the 
legal green plant material with either AM-2201 or any other synthetic 
cannabinoid. 
7) There was no testimony that Mr. Taylor knew it was illegal. 
8) There was no testimony that Mr. Taylor agreed to commit any crime, but that 
Mr. Taylor simply agreed to work for Mr. Alley for an amount just above 
mInImUm wage. 
9) There was some evidence adduced at trial regarding Mr. Taylor's knowledge as 
to the glassware, including the fact that there were items sold in the Red Eye Hut 
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that had marijuana-Ieaflogos on them, and that drug-test kits were sold in the 
store. 
10) There was also evidence that the Red Eye Hut had multiple signs indicating 
that the glassware was for tobacco use only and that Mr. Taylor, as the cashier, 
was to eject anyone from the store that spoke of either ingesting 'Twizted 
Potpourri,' or mentioned illicit substances. 
R 349-350. 
Mr. Taylor argued that Instruction 27 relieved the State from having to prove in Count III 
that Mr. Taylor knowingly delivered a controlled substance. Mr. Taylor argued that this violated 
his Sixth Amendment jury trial right as well as his rights to due process and a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, §§ 7, 13, 18, and 21 of the Idaho Constitution. R 355-357. Mr. Taylor 
concluded: 
R396. 
... All of the Defendants in this case, regardless of their specific charge, were 
under the mistaken belief that 'Twizted Potpourri' was a legal substance. The 
State never met its burden in this case by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendants knew they were in possession of a synthetic cannabinoid, or that 
they reasonably believed 'Twizted Potpourri' was or contained a controlled 
substance. The State was relieved of this burden because Jury Instruction No. 27 
incorrectly instructed the jury, and required them to convict the Defendants based 
upon their ignorance. 
Mr. Taylor also argued that the instructions were misleading on the conspiracy counts. R 
349-363; 388-400. 
The District Court granted the new trial motion as to both the conspiracy counts: 
While it was perfectly proper for this Court to give instruction no. 27, mistake of 
the law, the jury should have been advised that it was applicable only to Counts III 
and IV, and did not apply to the conspiracy counts. Evidence was introduced at 
trial from which a jury could have concluded that the defendant lacked the 
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R431. 
necessary intent to violate the law so as to be guilty of conspiracy even though the 
acts he agreed to perform constituted the underlying crime. The jury should have 
been instructed that a good faith belief the object crime was not illegal is a defense 
to conspiracy. In the context of this case, failure of this Court to properly instruct 
the jury on a Defendant's defense is both an error in the directions to the jury and 
an error in the decision of a question of law. As provided in Idaho Code § 19-
2406(5), Defendant is entitled to a new trial in the instruct of justice on Count I, 
conspiracy to manufacture with intent to deliver a controlled substance. 
The Court likewise granted a new trial on the conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver 
paraphernalia. R 432. 
However, the Court held that "[t]he same considerations do not apply to the charge 
contained in Count III," and denied a new trial on the delivery count. R 432. 
As discussed above, conviction of delivery requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
knowledge of possession of a controlled substance. Instruction 27 negated that burden of proof 
by allowing conviction even if Mr. Taylor did not know that the potpourri contained a Schedule I 
substance. This misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Taylor as evidenced by the fact that he was 
convicted on less that sufficient evidence that he knowingly delivered a controlled substance. 
Lamphere, supra; Blake, supra; Armstrong, supra; Stefani, supra; Hopper, supra. Therefore, 
reversal of Mr. Taylor's conviction on Count III is required. Jd.; State v. Joy, supra. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor's conviction on Count III should be vacated and an acquittal entered because 
the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of knowledge. Likewise, his convictions on 
the two conspiracy charges should be vacated and acquittals entered because the evidence was 
insufficient in both to prove an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective and to prove the 
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requisite intent to commit the underlying crimes. In the alternative, the conviction on Count III 
should be reversed because the jury was misdirected so that the State's burden of proof of 
knowledge was negated. 
Respectfully submitted this 15 ~ay of July, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Matthew 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on July £,2013, I caused two true and correct copies ofthe 





The Office of the Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
De orah WhIpple 
30 
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter - The State of Idaho 
C.L. "Butch" Otter 
Our Governor 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 





C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER 
GOVERNOR 
News Release 
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GOVERNOR APPROVES SPICE RULE, APPLAUDS LOCAL MEASURES 
(BOISE) After providing an opportunity for the public and retailers to take the appropriate actions, 
Governor C.L "Butch" Otter today approved a temporary rule proposed by the State Board of Pharmacy 
adding chemicals commonly found in a substance known as "Spice" to the list of controlled substances 
in Idaho. 
The 2011 Legislature will consider permanently adding the chemicals in Spice, which mimic the active 
ingredient in marijuana, to Idaho's list of controlled substances. But with growing community concerns, 
the Governor said it was important to be aggressive in addressing the problem. 
"I appredate the local communities that already have acted to impose their own restrictions on Spice. 
Along with the Board of Pharmacy and the State Office of Drug POlicy, our local units of government and 
law enforcement agendes are working together to get this dangerous substance off our streets," 
Governor Otter said. "We are the 14th state to take action like thiS, and I'm confident we won't be the 
last. No doubt producers will try to skirt the ban, but I encourage aU Idahoans to join me in protecting 
the health and safety of our dtizens." 
Spice is an herbal plant mixture soaked in chemical compounds. The compounds were developed to 
mimic the active ingredient in marijuana - tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). One chemical under the 
proposed rule - HU-210 - is considered a controlled substance by the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). The other compounds commonly found in Spice are either listed as chemicals of 
concern by the DEA and are in the process of being temporarily listed under the Federal Controlled 
Substance Act or are analogues of such compounds. 
Spice also is packaged as K2, Genie, Ultra, Summit, Blonde, Yucatan Gold, Bombay Blue, Black Mamba 
and many other names. 
A survey of Idaho hospitals between February and August reported more than 80 emergency room visits 
in that six-month period. Spice is sold as an incense and "not for human consumption" as a means to 
avoid legal requirements and regulations. 
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Drug Enforcement Administration 
Office of Diversion Control 
Drug & Chemical Evaluation Section 
SALVIA DIVINORUM AND SALVINORIN A 
(Street Names: Maria Pastora, Sage of the Seers, 
Diviner's Sage, Salvia, Sally-D, Magic Mint) 
Introduction: 
Salvia divinorum is a perennial herb in the mint family 
native to certain areas of the Sierra Mazateca region of 
Oaxaca, Mexico. The plant, which can grow to over three 
feet in height, has large green leaves, hollow square stems 
and white flowers with purple calyces, can also be grown 
successfully outside of this region. Salvia divinorum has 
been used by the Mazatec Indians for its ritual divination 
and healing. The active constituent of Salvia divinorum has 
been identified as salvinorin A. Currently, neither Salvia 
divinorum nor any of its constituents, including salvinorin A, 
are controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA). 
Licit Uses: 
Neither Salvia divinorum nor its active constituent 
salvinorin A has an approved medical use in the U.S. 
Chemistry and Pharmacology: 
Salvinorin A, also called Divinorin A, is believed to be 
the ingredient responsible for the hallucinogenic effects of 
Salvia divinorum. Chemically, it is a neoclerodane 
diterpene found primarily in the leaves, and to a lesser 
extent in the stems. Although several other substances 
have been isolated from the plant, none have been shown 
to be psychoactive. 
In the U.S., plant material is typically either chewed or 
smoked. When chewed, the leaf mass and juice are 
maintained within the cheek area with absorption occurring 
across the lining of the oral mucosa (buccal). Effects first 
appear within 5 to 10 minutes. Dried leaves, as well as 
extract-enhanced leaves purported to be enriched with 
salvinorin A, are also smoked. Smoking pure salvinorin A, 
at a dose of 200-500 micrograms, results in effects within 
30 seconds and lasts about 30 minutes. 
Several studies have reported the effects of using 
either plant material or salvinorin A. Psychic effects include 
perceptions of bright lights, vivid colors and shapes, as well 
as body movements and body or object distortions. Other 
effects include dysphoria, uncontrolled laughter, a sense of 
loss of body, overlapping realities, and hallucinations 
(seeing objects that are not present). Adverse physical 
effects may include incoordination, dizziness, and slurred 
speech. 
Scientific studies show that salvinorin A is a potent and 
selective kappa opioid receptor agonist. Other drugs that 
act at the kappa opioid receptor also produce 
hallUCinogenic effects and dysphoria similar to that 
produced by salvinorin A. Salvinorin A does not activate 
the serotonin 2A receptor, which mediates the effects of 
other schedule I hallucinogens. 
Illicit Uses: 
Salvinorin A and Salvia divinorum products are abused 
for their ability to evoke hallucinogenic effects, which, in 





According to the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health (NSDUH) Report: Use of Specific Hallucinogens 
2006 published by SAMHSA in February 2008, it is 
estimated that 1.8 million persons aged 12 or older used 
Salvia divinorum in their lifetime, and approximately 
750,000 did so in the past year. Use was more common 
among young adults (18 to 25 years old) as opposed to 
adults aged 26 and older. Young adults were nearly three 
times more likely than youths aged 12 to 17 to have used 
Salvia divinorum in the past year. Use is more common in 
males than females among youth and young adults, 
according to NSDUH. 
According to DEA's National Forensic Laboratory 
Information System (NFLlS) and System to Retrieve 
Information From Drug Evidence (STRIDE), federal, state 
and local law enforcement officials encountered 78 drug 
exhibits in 2009,61 drug exhibits in 2010, and 91 exhibits in 
2011 identified as Salvia divinorum or salvinorin A. From 
January - March 2012, there were 11 drug exhibits 
identified as Salvia divinorum or salvinorin A. 
The Monitoring the Future survey reports that in 2011, 
1.6% of 8th graders, 3.9% of 10th graders, and 5.9% of 1 ih 
graders used "Salvia" in the past year. 
Illicit Distribution: 
Salvia divinorum is grown domestically and imported 
from Mexico and Central and South America. The Internet 
is used for the promotion and distribution of Salvia 
divinorum. It is sold as seeds, plant cuttings, whole plants, 
fresh and dried leaves, extract-enhanced leaves of various 
strengths (e.g., 5x, 10x, 20x, 30x) , and liquid extracts 
purported to contain salvinorin A. These products are also 
sold at local shops (e.g., head shops and tobacco shops). 
Control Status: 
Salvia divinorum and salvinorin A are not currently 
controlled under the Controlled Substances Act. Several 
states such as California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin have 
enacted legislation placing regulatory controls on Salvia 
divinorum and/or salvinorin A. 
Salvinorin A and/or Salvia divinorum have been placed 
under regulatory controls in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Sweden. 
Comments and additional information are welcomed by the 
Drug and Chemical Evaluation Section; Fax 202-353-1263, 
telephone 202-307-7183 or Email OD~@usdoj.gov. 
